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AUGMENTING OUR REALITY:  
THE (UN)OFFICIAL STRATEGY GUIDE  
TO PROVIDING FIRST AMENDMENT 
PROTECTION FOR PLAYERS AND 
DESIGNERS OF LOCATION-BASED 
AUGMENTED REALITY VIDEO GAMES 
COLLEEN SIGNORELLI† 
INTRODUCTION 
It is a warm July night, and the weather is perfect for a 
stroll.  You make your way towards the local park, expecting to 
clear your head in quiet solitude.  To your dismay, something is 
awry.  Dozens—perhaps hundreds—of people have invaded in 
and around your lovely local park.  Now that this gathering has 
tainted your walk, you approach someone, hoping that he will 
explain what has happened.  Before you can utter, “Excuse me,” 
people start shouting about a “vaporeon.”  Then the stampede 
begins. 
This bizarre scenario described above actually occurred in 
Central Park in New York City after the release of Pokémon Go.1  
Pokémon Go is a location-based augmented reality game that 
allows a person to catch virtual creatures, known as “pokémon,” 
through the screen of her phone.2  Not only has the game 
spawned thousands of pokémon, but it has also spawned dozens 
of questions regarding how the law should adapt in response to 
 
† Associate Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review, J.D. Candidate, 2019, St. 
John’s University School of Law; B.A., 2016, Fordham University. I would like to 
thank Professor Jeremy Sheff for his guidance and patience throughout the 
numerous drafts of my Note, as well as the Law Review editors and staffers for their 
hard work and support throughout the publication process. 
1 R. Darren Price, Rare Pokemon Sparks Stampede in Central Park, NBC 4 NEW 
YORK (July 18, 2016), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Pokemon-Go-Players-
Stampede-New-York-Central-Park-387303572.html. Central Park was not the only 
place to have a stampede caused by Pokémon Go players. Other stampedes occurred 
in Kaka’ako and Taipei, to name a few places. See Sunset Beach, Pokémon GO! 
Stampede: Kaka'ako, Honolulu, Oahu, Hawaii (08/13/2016), YOUTUBE (Aug. 15, 
2016), https://youtu.be/klUPu3Kvamc. 
2 See Andrew L. Rossow, Gotta Catch . . . a Lawsuit? A Legal Insight into the 
Intellectual, Civil, and Criminal Battlefield ‘Pokémon Go’ Has Downloaded onto 
Smartphones and Properties Around the World, 16 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. 
L. 329, 330 (2017). 
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the game and others like it.3  Important among these legal 
questions is how augmented reality games such as Pokémon Go 
intersect with the First Amendment.4  This question has yet to 
receive serious attention in the scholarly literature. 
What exactly is augmented reality?  It is “an enhanced 
version of reality created by the use of technology to overlay 
digital information on an image of something being viewed 
through a device.”5  In other words, augmented reality projects 
digital images into the real world, and people see these images 
through an electronic device.6  Location-based augmented reality, 
also known as markerless augmented reality, uses GPS to 
function.7  Although there are other types of augmented reality,8 
this Note will discuss only location-based augmented reality. 
 
 
3 These issues mainly revolve around property and tort law. For an overview of 
many of these private law issues, see generally Russow, supra note 2; Samuel 
Mallick, Note, Augmenting Property Law: Applying the Right To Exclude in the 
Augmented Reality Universe, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1057 (2017); Pramitha 
Krishnamurthyprakash, Potential Post-Pokémon Legal Issues for Augmented Reality, 
LAW360 (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/890096/potential-post-poke 
mon-legal-issues-for-augmented-reality. 
4 But see Brian Wassom, Sacred Ground: When (Augmented) Worlds Collide, 
AUGMENTED LEGALITY (July 15, 2017), http://www.wassom.com/sacred-ground-aug 
mented-worlds-collide.html. In his blog, Wassom makes an interesting argument 
that as augmented reality video games become more common, there may be a 
dispute among different games being played in the same physical space. Id. 
Although he mentions in passing that the government might be able to prohibit the 
playing of these augmented reality games in public places, Wassom fails to address 
the issue any further. See id. 
5 Ryan Mitchell, Comment, Pokémon Go-es Directly to Court: How Pokémon Go 
Illustrates the Issue of Virtual Trespass and the Need for Evolved Tort Laws, 49 TEX. 
TECH L. REV. 959, 962 (2017) (quoting Augmented Reality, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2014), https://www.merriam-webster.com/diction 
ary/augmented%20reality). 
6 In contrast, virtual reality replaces the real world with an artificial 
environment that has been digitally created, and people interact with this digital 
environment. See Om Malik, Pokémon Go Will Make You Crave Augmented Reality, 
THE NEW YORKER (July 12, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/poke 
mon-go-will-make-you-crave-augmented-reality. 
7 See Sanket Prabhu, Types of Augmented Reality (for Me and My Business), 
ARREVERIE LEARNING (Dec. 18, 2017), http://www.arreverie.com/blogs/types-of-
augmented-reality/. 
8 Other types include “marker-based” augmented reality, like QR codes, and 
“outlining” augmented reality, such as the lines that appear on side and rearview 
backup cameras in modern cars. See id. Even Snapchat utilizes augmented reality 
for its filters. See Husain Sumra, Augmented Reality Explained: What Is AR and 
What’s Coming?, WAREABLE (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.wareable.com/ar/every 
thing-you-need-to-know-about-augmented-reality. 
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Specifically, this Note will argue that the First Amendment 
applies to location-based augmented reality games in public 
forums, and, furthermore, the First Amendment protects 
designers and players of location-based augmented reality games 
in public forums.  This Note will not discuss these location-based 
games within the context of privacy rights or trespassing, issues 
that have been written about elsewhere.9  Part I of this Note will 
explore the law regarding freedom of speech and freedom of 
assembly in public forums, and permissible regulations of speech 
and assembly, including time, place, and manner restrictions and 
prior restraints, such as permits.  Part II will discuss Candy Lab, 
Inc. v. Milwaukee County, the first reported case to address 
whether location-based augmented reality games have First 
Amendment protection.10  Part III will explore the extent to 
which the First Amendment protects the designers and players of 
location-based augmented reality games, and possible 
regulations the government may use to lawfully curb the rights 
of the designers and players. 
I. THE THORNY FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE 
A. General 
The First Amendment is rich in case law; therefore, its 
analysis can be confusing.11  With the advancement of technology, 
the Supreme Court has continued to apply the same doctrine,12 
albeit with new wrinkles that depend largely upon the medium 
the Court is analyzing.13  In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants 
Ass’n, the Court recognized that video games are forms of speech 
 
9 See, e.g., Mallick, supra note 3, at 1057; Mitchell, supra note 5. 
10 266 F. Supp. 3d 1139 (E.D. Wis. 2017). 
11 For a summary of the development of the First Amendment and the benefits 
of the right of freedom of speech, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES §§ 11.1.1–11.1.2 (5th ed. 2015). The Supreme Court also 
discusses the value of this First Amendment freedom in Cohen v. California. 403 
U.S. 15, 24–25 (1971). 
12 See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (“[W]hatever the 
challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology, ‘the basic 
principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment's command, 
do not vary’ when a new and different medium for communication appears.” (quoting 
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952))). 
13 See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The 
moving picture screen, the radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the sound truck and 
the street corner orator have differing natures, values, abuses and dangers. 
Each . . . is a law unto itself . . . .”). 
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and therefore have First Amendment protection.14  By extension, 
location-based augmented reality video games should also enjoy 
some measure of First Amendment protection.  Discussed below 
are various hallmarks of free speech and freedom of assembly 
jurisprudence that will form part of the discussion of First 
Amendment protections for location-based augmented reality 
video games, the designers of these games, and the players of 
these games. 
B. Content-Based Versus Content-Neutral 
“[T]he First Amendment means that government has no 
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its 
subject matter, or its content.”15  Therefore, “[c]ontent-based 
regulations are presumptively invalid”16 and “subject to strict 
scrutiny.”17  A court determines whether a law is content-based 
by evaluating whether the law targets the topic or viewpoint of 
the speech.18  For example, a law that bans discussion of Harry 
Potter books but permits discussion of all other books would be 
content-based because it targets the topic of the speech.19  
Another subset of content-based regulation is viewpoint-based 
regulation,20 which is considered more suspect than regulations 
 
14 564 U.S. at 790. 
15 Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (citing Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24). 
16 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (citing Simon & Schuster, 
Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991)); see also 
City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 434 (2002) (citing Simon & 
Schuster, 502 U.S. at 115, 118). 
17 Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 434 (citing Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 115, 
118); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (“Our 
precedents thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, 
disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content.” 
(citing Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 115)). 
18 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015) (citing Sorrell v. IMS 
Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663–64 (2011)). The Court also states that it will 
consider a law content-based if it appears facially content-neutral but “cannot be 
‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,’ or [was] adopted 
by the government ‘because of disagreement with the message [the speech] 
conveys.’ ” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 
491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
19 Carey v. Brown demonstrates this kind of content-based law. 447 U.S. 455 
(1980). There, an ordinance prohibited picketing in residential neighborhoods unless 
it was related to a labor dispute for a place of employment. Id. at 457. The Supreme 
Court struck down the ordinance because it favored labor picketing over nonlabor 
picketing, and such targeting of the topic of the speech was unconstitutional. Id. at 
461–63. 
20 See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 
(1980). 
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targeting topics of speech.21  A law targets the viewpoint of the 
speech and therefore is also content-based if, for example, it 
allows pro-Harry Potter conventions but not anti-Harry Potter 
conventions.  If a court determines that a law is content-based, 
then the “[g]overnment [must] prove that the restriction furthers 
a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that 
interest.”22 
In contrast, a law is content-neutral if it is unrelated to the 
content of the speech.23  For example, a general ban on the 
burning of books in parks would be content-neutral because the 
content of the books is irrelevant—no one is permitted to burn 
any book within a park.24  The fact that the ban only applies to 
books and no other mediums does not equate to it being content-
based.25  The Supreme Court has described a law as content-
neutral if it is “justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech.”26  A law is content-neutral whether it “applies 
to all speech regardless of the message” or whether it regulates 
conduct and has an incidental effect on speech without regard to 
its content.27  For example, suppose a group obtains a permit to 
hold a demonstration in a park to protest communism.  As part of 
that demonstration, the group plans to burn books promoting 
communism.  However, an ordinance bans the burning of books 
 
21 Cf. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723 (2000) (“Regulation of the subject 
matter of messages, though not as obnoxious as viewpoint-based regulation, is also 
an objectionable form of content-based regulation.” (citing Consol. Edison Co. of 
N.Y., 447 U.S. at 538)). 
22 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2231 (quoting Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC 
v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 734 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, 
e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (citing 
Carey, 447 U.S. at 461). 
23 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (citing Clark v. 
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). 
24 But see United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315–17 (1990). There, the 
government passed an act that banned the burning of United States flags. Id. at 314. 
Although the act had “no explicit content-based limitation[,]” the Court determined 
it was content-based because the government’s motive in passing this act was 
“related ‘to the suppression of free expression.’ ” Id. at 315 (quoting Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410 (1989)). If the book burning ban described above was 
motivated by the government’s desire to suppress the opinions of people who believe 
in censorship, then it might be content-based despite appearing content-neutral. 
25 See Candy Lab, Inc. v. Milwaukee Cty., 266 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1149 (E.D. Wis. 
2017) (“[A] speech regulation that applies to one medium (or subset thereof) but not 
others . . . ‘is insufficient by itself to raise First Amendment concerns.’ ” (quoting 
Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 660) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
26 E.g., Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 
781, 791 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
27 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 980. 
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in public parks because of the government’s interests in 
preventing fires from spreading and protecting the parks.  
Although the ordinance has an incidental effect on the 
demonstrators’ speech, the ordinance would still be content-
neutral because the regulation of the conduct was without regard 
to the content.28 
C. Public Forums 
Public forums are difficult to categorize.  They are 
government property open to the public, but the circumstances 
surrounding the facts of each case determine the availability for 
speech within a particular forum.29  The “character of the 
property at issue” will determine a person’s right to access that 
property and the limitations that the government may place on a 
person’s rights regarding that property.30  Legislatures may enact 
statutes “which prevent[] serious interference with normal usage 
of streets and parks.”31  For example, people may speak in a park 
or on the street without any hesitation, but imagine people 
having a conversation about Game of Thrones in the middle of a 
courtroom while a trial is occurring.  Generally, courts consider 
areas like streets, parks, and sidewalks to be public forums that 
are open for speech.32  In these “quintessential public forums, the 
government may not prohibit all communicative activity”33—even 
if allowing such speech imposes costs on the government.34  
 
28 Cf. Clark, 468 U.S. at 294–95 (concluding that the prohibition on sleeping in 
the park was content-neutral and had nothing to do with curbing the expressive 
message of the demonstrators’ sleeping). 
29 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, § 11.4.2.1, at 1187. 
30 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983). 
31 Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 153 (1969) (quoting Kunz 
v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293–94 (1951)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
32 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009) (citing Perry 
Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45) (“[M]embers of the public retain strong free speech 
rights when they venture into public streets and parks . . . .”); see also Hague v. 
Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (Roberts, J., concurring) (“Wherever 
the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust 
for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of 
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a 
part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.”). But see United 
States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727–30 (1990) (determining that a sidewalk on post 
office property was a non-public forum, not a traditional public forum). 
33 Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45. 
34 See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (“Any burden imposed 
upon the city authorities in cleaning and caring for the streets as an indirect 
2018] AUGMENTING OUR REALITY 949 
Although there are other types of forums which would include 
areas like public libraries and prisons,35 the focus of this Note 
will be on First Amendment rights regarding traditional public 
forums like parks, streets, and sidewalks. 
D. Vagueness and Overbreadth 
Vagueness and overbreadth are common issues in cases 
involving freedom of speech in public forums.  A statute is 
unconstitutionally vague if it “fails to provide a person of 
ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so 
standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously 
discriminatory enforcement.”36  Although the vagueness doctrine 
developed from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment,37 it is equally important in cases involving the First 
Amendment.  The Court has noted that freedom of speech must 
be protected, not only because it is important in society but also 
because the right itself would be easy to destroy.38  Therefore, 
“standards of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the 
area of free expression.”39  That being said, the Court  
 
 
 
 
 
 
consequence of such distribution [of leaflets] results from the constitutional 
protection of the freedom of speech and press.”). 
35 Other forum categories are designated public forums, which the government 
has opened for use by the public, and non-public forums, which the government uses 
for an intended purpose other than the freedom of speech. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 
U.S. at 45. A library would be a designated, or limited, public forum. See Kreimer v. 
Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1261–62 (3d Cir. 1992). Meanwhile, a prison would 
be a non-public forum. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966). For a 
summary of the considerations that the Supreme Court uses to determine the type of 
forum, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, § 11.4.2.6, at 1209. 
36 United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008); see also Connally v. Gen. 
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (concluding that a law is unconstitutionally 
vague when “men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and 
differ as to its application”). 
37 Williams, 553 U.S. at 304. 
38 See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (“[Freedom of speech is] 
delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society. . . First 
Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive . . . .”). 
39 Id. at 432. 
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acknowledges that language itself is vague.40  Thus, while the 
vagueness standards require “narrow specificity,”41 the Court 
does not expect “perfect clarity.”42 
Overbreadth occurs when a law “prohibits a substantial 
amount of protected speech.”43  “[S]ubstantial overbreadth” does 
not merely mean that a Court will deem a statute as overbroad 
because there are a few scenarios in which the statute would 
“impermissibl[y]” apply to First Amendment rights.44  Instead, 
the statute must threaten to significantly curb recognized 
freedom of speech rights for it to be potentially overbroad.45  This 
requirement that the overbreadth be substantial likely stems 
from the fact that a person who violated a permissible 
application of the law can argue that the law would 
impermissibly apply to third parties.46  Although litigating for a 
third party generally is prohibited,47 the overbreadth doctrine is 
an exception. 
E. Expressive Conduct 
The Court does not recognize all conduct as speech.48  To be 
protected under the First Amendment, an activity needs to have 
more than a “kernel of expression.”49  Once the Court recognizes 
that conduct has First Amendment protection, “[t]he government 
generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than 
 
40 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (“Condemned to the 
use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language.”). 
41 Button, 371 U.S. at 433. 
42 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989) (“[P]erfect clarity and 
precise guidance have never been required even of regulations that restrict 
expressive activity.”). 
43 United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008); see also CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 11, § 11.2.2. 
44 Members of the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 
800 (1984). 
45 Id. at 801 (“[T]here must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will 
significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not 
before the Court for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds.”). 
46 Cf. Williams, 553 U.S. at 292 (explaining that the requirement for substantial 
overbreadth is to balance the need to deter the chilling of free speech with the wish 
not to strike down a perfectly constitutional law). 
47 See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973). The issue of standing 
would arise in such situations, but that is beyond the scope of this Note. For a 
general discussion about standing and third parties, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 
11, § 2.5.4. 
48 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (“We cannot accept the 
view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ . . . .”). 
49 City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989). 
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it has in restricting the written or spoken word.”50  Expressive 
conduct may be subject to a reasonable time, place, and manner 
restriction.51 
F. Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions 
The aim of a “time, place, and manner restriction” is for “the 
government to regulate speech in a public forum in a manner 
that minimizes disruption of a public place while still protecting 
freedom of speech.”52  Time, place, and manner restrictions are 
reasonable, and therefore permissible, “provided [that they] ‘are 
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, 
that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest, and that they leave open ample 
alternative channels for communication of the information.’ ”53  
In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Court stated that while a 
time, place, and manner restriction must be “narrowly tailored” 
to meet the government’s interest, it does not have to be the 
“least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so.”54  The 
Court did note, however, that the restriction also may not 
“burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further 
the government’s legitimate interests.”55 
A time, place, and manner restriction is justified without 
reference to the content of the regulated speech when it is 
content-neutral.56  For example, in Thomas v. Chicago Park 
 
50 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989). But see James. M. McGoldrick, 
Jr., Symbolic Speech: A Message from Mind to Mind, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 25–26 
(2008) (“[T]he Johnson claim that courts have a ‘freer hand’ in regulating symbolic 
speech was in error. . . . The only difference that should exist between the test for 
symbolic speech and pure speech should relate to any difference in state interests 
raised by the symbolic aspects to the speech.”). 
51 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
52 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, § 11.4.2.2, at 1194. 
53 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citing Clark, 468 
U.S. at 293); Clark, 468 U.S. at 293; see also Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981). But see generally Eugene Volokh, 
Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2417 (1996). In his essay, Volokh argues that courts should reject the 
strict scrutiny analysis altogether because it leads to inconsistent outcomes. Id. at 
2460–61. 
54 Ward, 491 U.S. at 798. 
55 Id. at 799; see also McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2535 (2014). 
56 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Occasionally, a time, place, and 
manner restriction will be upheld despite being content-based. See Burson v. 
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197–98, 211 (1992) (holding that requiring solicitors of votes 
to stand one hundred feet away from the entrance of a polling place satisfied strict 
scrutiny). 
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District, the Court held that an ordinance requiring persons to 
obtain a permit when there is a gathering of fifty or more people 
was a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction.57  The 
Court reasoned that it was content-neutral because any 
gathering of fifty or more people required a permit regardless of 
what the gathering was for.58  Furthermore, denial of a permit 
was irrelevant to the content of the speech.59 
Once the Court has established that the law is content-
neutral, it will determine if the law is narrowly tailored for that 
significant governmental interest.60  Several significant 
governmental interests that the Supreme Court has recognized 
include protecting “traditional public forums” from “excessive 
noise,”61 “ensuring public safety,”62 allowing pedestrians and 
motor vehicles to move about freely,63 “avoiding visual clutter,”64 
and protecting national parks.65  In acknowledging these 
significant government interests, the Court recognizes the rights 
of the majority in society.  For example, by protecting public 
forums from excessive noise, the government is protecting the 
unwilling listener’s “right to be let alone.”66  The right to be let 
alone remains a “recognizable privacy interest in avoiding 
unwanted communication” although the right is much less 
important in public forums than it is in one’s own home.67 
 
 
57 Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 322 (2002). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. When a permit was denied, the Park District had to explain in writing 
why the permit was denied and, when possible, suggest ways to cure defects in the 
application. Id. at 318–19. If denial was due to that place being unavailable, the 
Park District had to suggest other times or places to hold the event. Id. at 319. 
60 See McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2530 (“The content-neutrality prong of the Ward 
test is logically antecedent to the narrow-tailoring prong, because it determines the 
appropriate level of scrutiny.”). 
61 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989). 
62 See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 376 (1997). 
63 See Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994). 
64 Members of the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 
806–07 (1984). 
65 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 297–98 (1984). 
66 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716–17 (2000) (“The unwilling listener's 
interest in avoiding unwanted communication has been repeatedly identified in our 
cases. It is an aspect of the broader ‘right to be let alone’ that one of our wisest 
Justices characterized as ‘the most comprehensive of rights and the right most 
valued by civilized men.’ ” (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting))). 
67 Id. at 716. 
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Despite the Court recognizing these governmental interests 
as significant, the law may still fail if “a substantial portion of 
the burden on speech does not serve to advance [the 
government’s] goals.”68  For example, in United States v. Grace, 
the Supreme Court struck down a regulation that prohibited 
persons on the public sidewalks surrounding a courthouse from 
displaying flags, signs, or other devices that would draw the 
public’s attention to any organization.69  The Court reasoned that 
the government had enacted the regulation to ensure peace and 
order around the courthouse, but this total ban on the sidewalk 
did not advance this governmental interest.70  Thus, the ban was 
not justified, and the Court struck it down.71 
Finally, if the Court finds that a law is content-neutral and 
is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, it 
will uphold the law if ample alternative channels of 
communication remain.  Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence provides an excellent example of this ample alternative 
channels prong.72  There, demonstrators wished to call attention 
to the homeless by, among other things, sleeping in tents in a 
park.73  Yet, the demonstration was to occur in a park where 
people were not allowed to sleep.74  The demonstrators argued 
that the inability to sleep in the parks curtailed their ability to 
demonstrate the plight of the homeless.75  The Supreme Court 
agreed with the demonstrators but ultimately decided that the 
time, place, and manner restriction was reasonable.76  The 
demonstrators had been permitted to erect a symbolic tent city 
and continue a twenty-four-hour vigil; therefore, the Court was 
satisfied with the other channels of communication open to the 
demonstrators.77 
 
68 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989). 
69 461 U.S. 171, 183–84 (1983). 
70 Id. at 182; see also Ward, 491 U.S. at 799. 
71 Grace, 461 U.S. at 183. 
72 468 U.S. 288 (1984). 
73 Id. at 289. 
74 Id. at 290–91. More specifically, park regulations prohibited camping in this 
park. Id. “Camping,” as defined in the regulation, included “using any tents 
or . . . other structure . . . for sleeping.” Id. (alteration in original). 
75 Id. at 296. 
76 Id. at 298. 
77 Id. at 295. 
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G. Prior Restraints – Permits 
A “prior restraint” “describe[s] administrative and judicial 
orders forbidding certain communications when issued in 
advance of the time that such communications are to occur.”78  
Common types of prior restraints are license and permit 
requirements.79  Although prior restraints are presumptively 
invalid,80 the Supreme Court will often uphold a permit or license 
requirement as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction 
if it meets three criteria.81 
First, the government must have an important reason to 
require a license or permit.82  For example, the government may 
require a permit to host a parade or demonstration to prevent 
multiple groups from attempting to use the same space at one 
time and to give the government notice to provide “proper 
policing.”83  Second, the government must provide clear 
standards that “leav[e] almost no discretion to the licensing 
authority.”84  The reason for limiting discretion is clear:  Such 
discretion could easily lead to censorship of viewpoints that the 
license-granting authority disagrees with.85  Finally, the licensing 
or permit system must have procedural safeguards.86  When the 
government requires permits in a public forum, it does not 
violate the procedural safeguard prong by failing to initiate 
litigation every time it denies a permit.87  As long as the licensing 
 
78 Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (emphasis omitted). 
79 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, § 11.2.3.4, at 1011. 
80 N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam). 
81 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, § 11.2.3.4, at 1011. 
82 Id. 
83 See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941). 
84 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, § 11.2.3.4, at 1011; cf. Cox, 312 U.S. at 576 
(“[T]he licensing board [is] not vested with arbitrary power or an unfettered 
discretion . . . its discretion must be exercised with ‘uniformity of method of 
treatment upon the facts of each application, free from improper or inappropriate 
considerations and from unfair discrimination . . . .’ ”). 
85 See, e.g., Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 284 (1951) (concluding that the 
City Council denied permits to the Jehovah’s Witnesses because it disagreed with 
their opinions); see also City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 
757 (1988) (“[A] licensing statute placing unbridled discretion in the hands of a 
government official or agency constitutes a prior restraint and may result in 
censorship.”). 
86 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, § 11.2.3.4, at 1011, 1013. 
87 See Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 322 (2002). But see Freedman v. 
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965) (“The teaching of our cases is that, because only a 
judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity 
to freedom of expression, only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices 
to impose a valid final restraint.”). 
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authorities have almost no discretion, and there is some form of 
review, the permit requirement in a public forum has passed the 
procedural safeguard prong.88 
H. Freedoms of Assembly and Association 
“The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those 
of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental.”89  It 
“[is] regarded not only as an independent right but also as a 
catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First 
Amendment rights . . . .”90  An assembly of people may advocate 
their views more effectively than only one or two people 
advocating something because others may more easily ignore 
them.91  Indeed, the act of assembling itself is a form of 
expression.92  People may assemble for a variety of reasons, 
including to speak, to learn, to watch, to play, or to advocate; and 
most assembly in a public forum is acceptable as long as it is for 
a “lawful purpose.”93  However, the right of assembly may be 
curtailed by reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.94  
For example, people are generally not permitted to assemble in 
the middle of a busy intersection because that would interfere 
with the free flow of traffic.95 
Related to the freedom of assembly is the freedom of 
association.96  The First Amendment protects the freedom of 
association,97 regardless of whether the group is religious or 
 
88 See, e.g., Thomas, 534 U.S. at 324. 
89 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 578 (1980) (quoting De 
Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
90 Id. at 577. 
91 See infra note 100; see also John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of 
Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REV. 565, 597 (2010). 
92 See Inazu, supra note 91. 
93 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 578 (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. 
Org., 307 U.S. 496, 519 (1939) (Stone, J., concurring)). 
94 See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965) (“The rights of free speech and 
assembly . . . do not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may 
address a group at any public space and at any time.”). 
95 See id. at 554–55 (“[One cannot] insist upon a street meeting in the middle of 
Times Square at the rush hour as a form of freedom of speech or assembly. . . . A 
group of demonstrators could not insist upon the right to cordon off a street, or 
entrance to a public or private building, and allow no one to pass who did not agree 
to listen to their exhortations.”). 
96 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 990 (2011). 
97 Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 163 (1992); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 
23, 30 (1968); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 
384 U.S. 11, 18 (1966). 
956 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:943   
secular98 and regardless of whether it “associate[s] for the 
‘purpose’ of disseminating a certain message.”99  Derived from the 
freedom of assembly and freedom of speech, the Court first 
recognized the freedom of association in NAACP v. Alabama ex 
rel. Patterson.100  Although the Supreme Court has sometimes 
used the freedoms of assembly and association 
interchangeably,101 “assemblies were probably understood as ad 
hoc groups gathered in public or private while associations 
constituted more permanent groupings of citizens, meeting either 
publicly or in private.”102 
“An association must . . . engage in expressive activity that 
could be impaired in order to be entitled to protection.”103  The 
First Amendment protects associations despite when some 
members of a group act or advocate in ways that are not 
protected.104  Although the Supreme Court has stated that it will 
“give deference to an association’s view of what would impair its 
expression,”105 it has imposed limitations to the breadth of its 
deference.  For example, a court will not protect people’s freedom 
 
98 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 
189 (2012). 
99 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655 (2000). 
100 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (“Effective advocacy of both public and private 
points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group 
association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the 
close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly. . . . It is beyond debate 
that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an 
inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”); see also Thomas I. 
Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 1–2 
(1964); Inazu, supra note 91, at 609. 
101 Bhagwat, supra note 96, at 984; see, e.g., Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 
U.S. 382, 409, 411 (1950). 
102 See Bhagwat, supra note 96, at 990 (citing John D. Inazu, The Strange 
Origins of the Constitutional Right of Association, 77 TENN. L. REV. 485, 491 (2010)). 
103 Dale, 530 U.S. at 655. 
104 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 908 (1982) (“The right 
to associate does not lose all constitutional protection merely because some members 
of the group may have participated in conduct or advocated doctrine that itself is not 
protected.”); see also De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937) (“If the persons 
assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, . . . they may be prosecuted for their 
conspiracy or other violation of valid laws. But it is a different matter when the 
State, instead of prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes upon mere participation 
in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal 
charge.”). 
105 Dale, 530 U.S. at 653. 
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to associate to the extent that they are doing something illegal,106 
nor will it protect the freedom of association when the purpose of 
that association is to “depriv[e] third parties of their lawful 
rights.”107 
II. CANDY LAB, INC. V. MILWAUKEE COUNTY 
At the time of writing this Note, Candy Lab, Inc. v. 
Milwaukee County is unique because it is the first and only case 
that addresses First Amendment protections related to location-
based augmented reality games in public forums.108  In Candy 
Lab, the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted a preliminary 
injunction against the enforcement of an ordinance that would 
require a company to obtain a permit for its location-based 
augmented reality game to be played in parks.109 
The ordinance itself was adopted in light of the 
unanticipated popularity of Pokémon Go.110  At the game’s peak, 
Pokémon Go “players trashed Milwaukee County parks, stayed 
after park hours, caused significant traffic congestion, and made 
excessive noise.”111  In response, Milwaukee County spent 
thousands of dollars to maintain its parks and provide more 
police services.112  Additionally, the County passed an ordinance 
 
106 See, e.g., Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 933 (recognizing the 
legitimacy of the demonstrators’ objectives but refusing to protect the violent 
conduct of some of the demonstrators). 
107 Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 776 (1994). 
108 See Kimberly I. Culp & Taylor Sachs, Candy Lab and the Changing Reality 
of Augmented Reality, LAW360 (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/ 
956398/candy-lab-and-the-changing-reality-of-augmented-reality; see also Brian 
Wassom, Game On: Candy Lab AR Files First Amendment Challenge to Milwaukee’s 
Pokemon Go-Inspired Ordinance, AUGMENTED LEGALITY (Apr. 21, 2017), 
http://www.wassom.com/game-candy-lab-ar-files-first-amendment-challenge-
milwaukees-pokemon-go-inspired-ordinance.html#more-6545. The court itself also 
acknowledges that it is deciding on very new issues. See Candy Lab, Inc. v. 
Milwaukee Cty., 266 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1145 (E.D. Wis. 2017). As a side note, a class 
action lawsuit has been filed against Niantic, the company that created Pokémon 
Go, because people have asserted their rights to privacy against Niantic. See Class 
Action Complaint at 3–4, Marder v. Niantic, Inc., No. 4:16-cv-04300 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 
29, 2016). 
109 266 F. Supp. 3d at 1154. 
110 See id. at 1142–43. Another Pokémon Go-related bill was proposed in Illinois. 
It was the “Location-Based Video Game Protection Act,” otherwise known as 
“Pidgey’s Law.” See H.B. 6601, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2016). The 
purpose of the bill was to provide a property owner a procedure to have a location-
based video game removed from the owner’s property. Id. It is unlikely that this bill 
will be passed, however, because it was adjourned sine die on January 10, 2017. Id. 
111 Candy Lab, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 1141. 
112 Id. 
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that required companies to obtain permits before their location-
based augmented reality games could be played in Milwaukee 
County Parks.113 
Candy Lab, Inc. was a company that developed the app 
“Texas Rope ‘Em,” which is a location-based augmented reality 
game.114  Texas Rope ‘Em is similar to a traditional poker game, 
and part of the gameplay involves players traveling to real-world 
locations to collect cards.115  These cards are then used when 
playing against the dealer in the game.116  Candy Lab, Inc. moved 
for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of Milwaukee 
County’s permit requirement.117 
In granting the preliminary injunction, the court considered 
many issues that arose regarding the rights of an augmented 
reality game.118  Did the game qualify as a “game” that was 
protected under the First Amendment?  Was the permit content-
neutral?  Did it provide little discretion to the licensing 
authority?  Was the ordinance itself unconstitutionally vague or 
overbroad?  Or was it narrowly tailored to serve a substantial 
government interest?  Did the government leave ample 
alternative channels of communication, or did the ordinance 
substantially burden more speech than necessary? 
 
113 Id. This ordinance is not the first one a legislature has passed to prevent 
children from playing games. The Candy Lab court cites to the case Weigand v. 
Village of Tinley Park, where a town ordinance prohibited anyone “to play any 
games upon any street, alley, or sidewalk, or other public places except when a block 
party permit has been issued by the President and the Board of Trustees.” 114 F. 
Supp. 2d 734, 736 (N.D. Ill. 2000). Because of this ordinance, police ticketed parents, 
calling them “irresponsib[le]” for allowing their children to play games on the 
sidewalk. Id. The court found that the statute was unconstitutionally vague because 
it failed to define the term “game” and was overly broad because it could apply to 
anything from trading Pokémon cards and playing chess to playing tag during 
recess. Id. at 736–38. The broad reaches of the ordinance failed to be narrowly 
tailored for any government interest, and instead, the ordinance substantially 
burdened more speech than necessary. Id. at 737. Therefore, the court granted a 
preliminary injunction because it found that the ordinance was unconstitutional 
under rational basis scrutiny. Id. at 737–38. Later, the court granted a permanent 
injunction. See Weigand v. Vill. of Tinley Park, 129 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1173 (N.D. Ill. 
2001). 
114 Candy Lab, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 1141. 
115 Id. 
116 Josephine Munis, Candy Lab, Inc. Launches Texas Rope ‘Em!, CANDY LAB 
NEWS (Mar. 12, 2017), http://news.candylab.com/2017/03/candy-lab-inc-launches-
texas-rope-em.html. 
117 Candy Lab, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 1141. 
118 See id. 
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The ordinance required companies to obtain permits for 
virtual and location-based augmented reality games before the 
games would be permitted to be played in any Milwaukee County 
Parks.119  Once a permit was obtained, the company would have 
to limit the game to “those areas designated with a permit for 
such use by the Director of the Department of Parks, Recreation, 
and Culture [(“Director”)].”120  The permit process included the 
Director reviewing the game “to determine the appropriateness of 
the application based on site selection, protection of rare flora 
and fauna, personal safety, and the intensity of game activities 
on park lands.”121  Although the game would only be permitted to 
operate during standard park hours, the Director could also 
authorize special events to occur outside the park’s normal 
operating hours.122 
The ordinance defined “virtual gaming” as “an activity 
during which a person can experience being in a three-
dimensional environment and interact with that environment 
during a game.”123  The ordinance further explained “virtual 
gaming,” stating that “the game typically consists of an artificial 
world of images and sounds created by a computer that is 
affected by the actions of a person who is experiencing it.”124  The 
ordinance stated that Pokémon Go was an example of “virtual 
gaming,” and it implied that Pokémon Go would also be a 
“location-based augmented reality game[].”125  However, the 
ordinance never actually defined the term “location-based 
augmented reality game.”126 
The permit application required for “virtual gaming” was ten 
pages long and required a company to provide an extensive 
amount of information, including event dates and times, 
estimated attendance, if the event would be advertised and how, 
and the location within the park.127  The companies were 
required to provide “detailed plans for garbage collection, on-site 
security, and medical services,” all of which the companies would 
 
119 Id. at 1143. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 1143–44. 
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have to provide for themselves.128  The companies also had to 
have liability insurance and pay several fees.129  Despite all of 
these requirements, the Director could still demand more 
information about the event, and after all of this, the parks have 
“sole discretion [to] grant, deny, revoke, or suspend any permit, 
at any time and for any reason.”130  Violation of the ordinance 
could result in a myriad of punishments:  Violators could be fined 
between $10 and $200, and an unpaid fine could result in a court 
order of up to ninety days in jail.131  Police officers could arrest 
violators, and the Director could even issue citations.132 
In response to this tedious permit process, Candy Lab, Inc., 
which planned to release the then-new location-based augmented 
reality game “Texas Rope ‘Em,” requested a preliminary 
injunction against the enforcement of the ordinance.133  Before 
the court ultimately granted the preliminary injunction, the 
court first determined whether Texas Rope ‘Em qualified for 
First Amendment protection.134  It accepted that video games had 
First Amendment protection and that the First Amendment 
continued to apply when newer mediums developed.135  The court 
also believed that Texas Rope ‘Em contained enough expressive 
conduct to qualify for First Amendment protection even if the 
game itself “is not the expressive equal of Anna Karenina or 
Citizen Kane.”136  Therefore, the court concluded that Candy 
Lab’s game enjoyed a measure of protection under the First 
Amendment.137 
 
128 Id. at 1144. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 1141. Candy Lab first launched Texas Rope ‘Em on March 10, 2017. 
See Candy Lab, Inc., Welcome to Texas Rope ‘Em!, YOUTUBE (Mar. 10, 2017), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=egt75ZrYH3Q. 
134 See Candy Lab, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 1146. 
135 Id.; see supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
136 Candy Lab, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 1146 (quoting Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 
F.3d 1235, 1241 (9th Cir. 2013)). The court made it clear that it was not going to 
make “aesthetic judgments, since the task of courts is not to act as critics.” Id. 
137 Id. at 1147. In concluding that Texas Rope ‘Em had First Amendment 
protection, the court is the first to recognize First Amendment rights for augmented 
reality games. Id. at 1146. Interestingly, another caveat for the court here was 
determining whether Texas Rope ‘Em qualified for protection despite having 
gambling elements to its gameplay. Id. at 1147. Because the game was free, lacked 
prizes, and relied on more than mere chance, the court believed that the game was 
not illegal gambling, which would have resulted in the game having no protection 
under the First Amendment. Id. 
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After determining that Texas Rope ‘Em qualified for First 
Amendment protection, the court analyzed whether Milwaukee 
County’s ordinance was a reasonable time, place, and manner 
restriction on location-based augmented reality games.138  The 
court first determined that the ordinance was content-neutral 
because the undesirable effects of Pokémon Go—not a disdain for 
Pokémon Go itself—prompted the legislature to create 
regulations that would prevent other and all augmented reality 
games from reproducing those undesirable effects.139  The fact 
that the regulation applied only to a subset of the augmented 
reality medium did not result in a contrary conclusion.140  
Although one could argue that the ordinance attacked the 
expressive quality of location-based augmented reality games 
themselves because it limited the interactive aspects of the game, 
the court was unwilling to take the analysis to this extreme.141 
Despite holding that the ordinance was content-neutral, the 
court found that the ordinance had myriad problems, making it 
unconstitutional.142  Among these problems was that the 
ordinance did not appear to be narrowly tailored to serve the 
government’s interests.143  Instead of targeting the players, the 
ordinance targeted the companies producing augmented reality 
games.144  In targeting the companies, the ordinance treated the 
playing of location-based augmented reality games as if such 
playing constituted an event that required the companies to 
provide clean-up and security, have insurance, and provide a 
general time frame in which people will be at the parks 
playing.145  Yet this was entirely inconsistent with how people 
play these games.146  The average player plays whenever she has 
 
138 See id. at 1148. 
139 See id. at 1149. 
140 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
141 See Candy Lab, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 1150. The argument was that a major 
part of the gameplay of augmented reality video games is interacting with the real 
world. Ordinances such as Milwaukee’s would seriously restrict gameplay by 
limiting the areas in which a person could physically play the game, thus limiting 
part of the expression. Id. 
142 See generally id. 
143 See id. at 1153. 
144 See id. 
145 See id. 
146 See id. Events may sometimes be coordinated in advance to occur at a certain 
place, but they are not the norm. It took Niantic a year to hold its first official 
“Pokémon Go Fest,” and it is unlikely to have another official in-person event any 
time soon. See Megan Farokhmanesh, I Went to Pokémon Go Fest, and It Was a 
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some free time regardless of the time or location.147  Regulating 
augmented reality games in such a manner is similar to 
requiring a company to obtain a permit every time someone 
wants to read its book in a park.  It expects a company to know 
when such an event will occur even though people usually read at 
their own inclination.148  In short, the ordinance showed that the 
government, in its misunderstanding of augmented reality 
games, “sacrific[ed] speech for efficiency,” which is 
impermissible.149 
The court did not address whether the ordinance left ample 
alternative channels for communication of the expression.  
However, the ordinance might fail this prong as well.  The ability 
to play location-based augmented reality games anywhere is 
already curtailed by people’s privacy rights.150  The areas where 
these games have the most First Amendment protection are 
public forums such as parks and sidewalks.151  Because of how 
difficult it would be to obtain a permit based on Milwaukee’s 
ordinance, the playing of augmented reality games would 
practically be limited to only sidewalks.  Whether the sidewalks 
alone leave ample alternatives for location-based augmented 
reality games would be a difficult issue to determine, but given 
the large amount of protection the First Amendment provides in 
public forums,152 such a limitation would likely fail this prong.153 
The permit requirement also fails in being a reasonable time, 
place, and manner restriction.  A significant defect is that the 
permit process left too much discretion to the licensing 
authority.154  Under the ordinance, the licensing authority “in its 
sole discretion [could] grant, deny, revoke, or suspend any 
 
Disaster, THE VERGE (July 25, 2017, 11:37 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/ 
7/25/16019404/pokemon-go-fest-refunds-disaster-review. 
147 See Candy Lab, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 1153. 
148 This metaphor illustrates the problems of the ordinance’s permit process, but 
books and location-based augmented reality games are not completely analogous 
since companies do have some control over where elements of their games appear. 
See Class Action Complaint, supra note 108, at 6–7. 
149 See Candy Lab, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 1154 (quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. 
Ct. 2518, 2534 (2014)). 
150 See Class Action Complaint, supra note 108, at 3–4. 
151 See cases cited supra note 32. 
152 See cases cited supra note 32. 
153 But cf. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 53 (1986) 
(holding that leaving a little over five percent of the entire land area in Renton open 
for use as an adult theater site allowed for ample alternative channels of 
communication). 
154 See Candy Lab, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 1151–52. 
2018] AUGMENTING OUR REALITY 963 
permit, at any time and for any reason.”155  Such unbridled 
discretion is not constitutional.156  Even without this warning on 
Milwaukee’s permit application, the standards themselves were 
so vague that they allowed too much discretion on their own.157 
The ordinance listed several criteria that would be used to 
determine whether to grant a permit, mainly “the 
appropriateness of the application based on site selection, 
protection of rare flora and fauna, personal safety, and the 
intensity of game activities on park lands.”158  The court 
questioned how a company would know which plants were “rare,” 
or when people were trampling on too many flowers, or how 
“intensity” was defined.159  The ordinance also failed to explain 
what “site selection” would be appropriate for augmented reality 
games.160 
Another consideration the ordinance listed was “personal 
safety.”161  The court recognized that safety could be a reasonable 
concern allowed under the First Amendment, but it did not 
accept that “personal safety” was definite enough to be 
reasonable.162  Indeed, the entire ordinance was riddled with 
indefiniteness, for the ordinance did not define the term 
“location-based augmented reality games.”163  Because the 
considerations themselves were vague and the licensing 
authority had too much discretion, the court concluded that the 
ordinance also lacked the necessary procedural safeguards 
required for permits to be valid under the First Amendment.164  
Without adequate standards, a court would have trouble 
providing judicial review.165  In other words, “[w]ithout these 
guideposts, post hoc rationalizations by the licensing official and 
the use of shifting or illegitimate criteria are far too easy, making  
 
 
 
 
155 Id. at 1151. 
156 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
157 See Candy Lab, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 1152–53. 
158 Id. at 1151. 
159 See id. at 1152. 
160 See id. 
161 See id. 
162 See id. at 1152–53. 
163 See id. at 1143. 
164 See id. at 1150–52. 
165 See id. at 1151. 
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it difficult for courts to determine in any particular case whether 
the licensor is permitting favorable, and suppressing 
unfavorable, expression.”166 
III. REGULATING THE PLAYERS WITH REASONABLE TIME, PLACE, 
AND MANNER RESTRICTIONS WOULD BEST PROTECT THE 
GOVERNMENT’S INTERESTS AND PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF THE 
DESIGNERS AND PLAYERS 
The ordinance in Candy Lab imposed such a significant 
number of requirements that the court rightfully granted a 
preliminary injunction against its enforcement.167  Yet the heavy 
burden imposed by the ordinance ultimately made it an easy case 
to determine.  The more difficult questions are whether and 
when the government may restrict location-based augmented 
reality games in public forums. 
A. Defining “Location-Based Augmented Reality Games” 
Before placing any sort of restrictions on location-based 
augmented reality games, there needs to be a working definition 
for “location-based augmented reality games.”  Without a 
workable definition, a law will likely fail for being 
unconstitutionally vague.168  In attempting to define the term, a 
good place to begin would be the dictionary.169  As stated in the 
Introduction, augmented reality is “an enhanced version of 
reality created by the use of technology to overlay digital 
information on an image of something being viewed through a 
device.”170  Location-based augmented reality uses GPS or 
technology of a similar nature to project the augmented images 
 
166 See id. (quoting City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 
758 (1988)). 
167 The Weigand court later held the ordinance that prohibited playing games 
was both facially and otherwise unconstitutional. See Weigand v. Vill. of Tinley 
Park, 129 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1173 (N.D. Ill. 2001). The court therefore granted a 
permanent injunction. Id. 
168  Weigand v. Vill. of Tinley Park, 114 F. Supp. 2d 734, 738 (N.D. Ill. 2000); cf. 
Candy Lab, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 1143 (noting that “location-based augmented reality 
games” were not defined in the ordinance). 
169 Justices may sometimes use dictionaries to help them determine the 
boundaries of a statute. For example, Justice Alito referred to the dictionary to 
define the word “maiming” when it lacked a definition under California law. See 
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 810 & n.4 (2011) (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
170 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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when someone goes from one place to another.171  Therefore, a 
potentially good definition of location-based augmented reality 
would be “an enhanced version of reality that uses GPS, satellite, 
or other similar technology to overlay, or project, a digital image 
of something being viewed through a smartphone, tablet, or other 
similar device.”172 
B. Creating a Reasonable Time, Place, and Manner Restriction 
Once there is a working definition, the legislature would 
need to devise a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction.  
Some might argue that no time, place, and manner restriction 
would be reasonable in a public forum because such a restriction 
would limit the interactive part of the expression of the game.173  
Location-based augmented reality games are distinct from other 
video games because the vast majority of the gameplay requires 
traveling to different locations to access features of the game; 
they are not like standard video games which will provide the 
same gameplay and features regardless of the location.  By 
limiting location-based augmented reality games even in public 
forums, the government would arguably be limiting the 
expression itself because players would then be unable to play 
the game the way it was meant to be played. 
This argument that no time, place, and manner restriction in 
a public forum would be reasonable would likely fail in a 
courtroom.  Policy considerations would most likely lead a court 
to conclude that a time, place, and manner restriction can be 
upheld, but the government has to do its part in making the 
restriction reasonable.174  Before a court will consider a 
 
171 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
172 Limiting restrictions on augmented reality games to only those that are 
location-based could potentially cause other problems. For example, in 2012, 
Nintendo released the game “Spirit Camera: The Cursed Memoir,” a Nintendo 3ds 
game whose gameplay and extra features relied heavily on the use of marker-based 
augmented reality in the form of QR codes. See Spirit Camera: The Cursed Memoir, 
NINTENDO, https://www.nintendo.com/games/detail/ZlXHN669zp19PVP0PJ7Nh8K4 
TVZ2DBKU (last visited Feb. 7, 2019). While the gameplay is limited to a smaller 
vicinity than that of any location-based augmented reality game, “Spirit Camera: 
The Cursed Memoir” still requires a player to do some moving around to play the 
game. See Audrey Drake, Spirit Camera: The Cursed Memoir Review, IGN (Apr. 13, 
2012), http://www.ign.com/articles/2012/04/13/spirit-camera-the-cursed-memoir-rev 
iew. It would seem strange for a person to be allowed to play this augmented reality 
game in an area while prohibiting location-based augmented reality games. 
173 See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
174 See Candy Lab, Inc. v. Milwaukee Cty., 266 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1154 (E.D. 
Wis. 2017). 
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restriction reasonable, the government interest must be 
significant.175  The concerns surrounding players of location-
based augmented reality games are that people will play while 
driving, damage parks, litter, and disturb other people while 
playing.  Preventing or limiting all of these things are significant 
government interests that the courts recognize.176  Although a 
government interest may be significant—and the interest in 
curbing the harmful effects of location-based augmented reality 
games is significant—a law will not be reasonable if it 
substantially burdens more speech than necessary in advancing 
the government’s goals.177 
1. Regulating the Designers 
Requiring companies to obtain permits for public forums 
whenever they release a new location-based augmented reality 
game may never be reasonable because such a requirement 
would substantially burden more speech than necessary, 
especially if the process of obtaining each separate permit 
required paying fees.178  Imagine that a company releases its 
game in every city in the United States, and then imagine that 
company filling out permit applications and paying fees to every 
municipality just to release its game.  Faced with the prospect of 
hundreds of applications and fees, the company may choose to 
seriously limit its locations in the United States or avoid 
releasing a game in the United States entirely, thus effectively 
“shut[ting] off communication before it takes place.”179 
Requiring the company to obtain permits would also be 
ineffective in advancing the government’s interest since the 
people playing location-based augmented reality games are 
causing the undesirable effects.  Obtaining a permit is not going 
to prevent a person playing one of these games from littering or 
sneaking into a park after hours.  In fact, the company has little 
control over when people decide to play their game. 180  Therefore, 
 
175 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
176 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
177 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
178 Charging a fee to obtain a permit, however, may be impermissible. See Cox v. 
New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 577 (1941) (“There is nothing contrary to the 
Constitution in the charge of a fee limited to the purpose stated.”). 
179 See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 506 
(1970). 
180 This is not to say that companies should not attempt to curb some of the 
problems that have arisen related to location-based reality games. For example, a 
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requiring the company to obtain a permit for people to play their 
game in a public forum is likely unreasonable unless the 
company intends to host an official event like Niantic did with 
Pokémon Go Fest.181 
2. Regulating the Players 
Indeed, targeting the company because of the conduct of the 
players is equivalent to “burn[ing] the house to roast the pig.”182  
A better approach would be to regulate the players themselves.183  
However, when regulating the players, there is a tension.  On the 
one hand, the players are protected under the First Amendment.  
On the other hand, non-players have their own rights, and the 
government has interests to protect. 
a. The Rights of Individual Players Versus the Rights of an 
Assembly of Players 
Part of the difficulties involved in regulating players results 
from the number of players playing at a given time in a given 
place.  An individual player can cause problems if she breaks into 
a park at night or tries to cross the street without paying 
attention.  Yet the individual player would be easier to regulate, 
and she is much less likely to infringe on the rights of non-
players.  When the individual player becomes a group, or an 
assembly, more problems arise, the group becomes harder to 
regulate, and more non-players have likely had their rights 
infringed upon.  Yet the rights of the assembly of players are 
arguably more protected by the First Amendment than the rights 
of the individual player because a court may consider an 
individual’s act of playing to be less deserving of protection as 
expressive conduct.184 
 
company could lock down its application once a person starts moving over twenty 
miles per hour, thus eliminating accidents occurring when a person plays a game 
while driving. See Eric Lindenfeld, Pokemon Go’s Product Liability Woes, LAW360 
(Aug. 3, 2016, 3:56 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/824588/pokemon-go-s-prod 
uct-liability-woes. A company could also have its game display a warning screen 
reminding the player to be aware of his or her surroundings when playing the game. 
Id. 
181 See Farokhmanesh, supra note 146. 
182 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). 
183 See Candy Lab, Inc. v. Milwaukee Cty., 266 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1153 (E.D. 
Wis. 2017) (citing Butler, 352 U.S. at 383). 
184 See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) 
(“[E]xpressive conduct [is] protected to some extent by the First Amendment.”). 
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When an individual plays a location-based augmented 
reality game, the act of playing is the expression.  Some may 
argue this activity is merely a “kernel of expression,” and thus, 
not deserving of protection.185  However, “video games 
communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many 
familiar literary devices . . . and through features distinctive to 
the medium.”186  Therefore, the Supreme Court has recognized 
that video games deserve First Amendment protection.187  If 
location-based augmented reality games had First Amendment 
protection, but an individual player playing an augmented 
reality game had less protection than the game itself, then, taken 
to its logical extreme, the protection of the expression of the game 
would be defeated because no one would be able to enjoy the 
expression of the game.  This problem would be akin to allowing 
a company to publish a book but then censoring the public from 
reading it.  This logical extreme is not to say that any regulation 
would be unconstitutional; for example, requiring individual 
players to abide by park rules would be constitutional as long as 
they were reasonable time, place, and manner regulations.188  
The point is that the individual’s act of playing deserves First 
Amendment protection.  This Note argues that both individual 
players and groups of players are equally deserving of protection; 
however, legislatures should sometimes regulate individual 
players differently than they regulate groups of players because 
groups cause different problems. 
There are two ways to think about groups of players.  These 
groups may be classified as assemblies, which have been thought 
to mean ad hoc groups that may appear spontaneously.189  
Alternatively, these groups may be classified as associations, 
which are more permanent groups that meet.190  Groups of 
players appear to have elements of assemblies and associations.  
For example, a player may decide to go out with his or her 
friends with the intent to play an augmented reality game.  The 
 
185 See City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989). 
186 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011). 
187 See id. 
188 See Clark, 468 U.S. at 298 (“All those who would resort to the parks must 
abide by otherwise valid rules for their use, just as they must observe the traffic 
laws, sanitation regulations, and laws to preserve the public peace.”). On a similar 
note, legislatures may prohibit people from reading in certain circumstances, such as 
when they are driving vehicles. 
189 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
190 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
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group gets to their agreed-upon location only to find dozens of 
other people playing the same game.  Organically, an assembly 
has formed.  Now suppose this player goes out to the same 
location every few days, knowing or expecting that she will find 
other players there.  Suddenly, the lines blur, and this group of 
people is edging towards an association.  In the context of one 
game, the difference matters very little because the players have 
the same rights whether they consider themselves a more 
permanent group or casual players.191  What matters is that 
there is a group of people assembling, and this assembling is 
generally protected by the First Amendment even if the reason 
for assembling is to play a location-based augmented reality 
game.192 
b. Enforcing Laws Already in Effect 
In Candy Lab, the court made several suggestions about how 
to regulate players, including “aggressively penalizing gamers 
who violate park rules or limiting gamers to certain areas of the 
park.”193  Either of these suggestions could be reasonable.  For 
example, most parks have a closing time.  Rather than being 
given a warning, players who are caught breaking such rules 
should be ticketed and have to pay a nominal fine.  Players who 
become too loud out of excitement may be charged with noise 
violations.  Players who decide to walk into the street to play 
may get fined for jaywalking.  If officers enforce these and other 
similar laws, then players may be deterred from engaging in 
some of their bad behaviors.  The benefit of targeting these 
violations of the law is that they do not impermissibly infringe on 
First Amendment rights.  The disadvantages are that targeting 
such violations becomes harder as the number of players  
 
 
 
191 This distinction might matter if players of different games find themselves 
conflicting within the same spheres. Then the players might associate strongly with 
one game over another. See supra note 4. It would be interesting if players argued 
that they had the freedom from associating with players of other games. Cf. 
Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. 
Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 680 (2010) (“ ‘Freedom of association,’ we have recognized, 
‘plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.’ ” (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 
468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). However, such an 
analysis is outside the scope of this Note. 
192 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
193 Candy Lab, Inc. v. Milwaukee Cty., 266 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1153 (E.D. Wis. 
2017). 
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increases.  Stopping and fining one or two violators would be 
easier than attempting to fine dozens of violators.  Likely, several 
violators would manage to avoid being penalized. 
Unlike an individual player, an assembly of players could 
also potentially violate laws that require permits for gatherings 
of a large group of people.194  Because of the organic nature of 
these player assemblies, it would seem unjust to fine players who 
appear in an assembly—even if large groups consistently form at 
a certain place at a certain time.  In such situations, officers 
should be able to disperse the players, but this solution appears 
problematic because of the general nature of location-based 
augmented reality games.  How does society expect players to 
obtain permits when the location, time frame, and number of 
players is so uncertain?195  Whether an individual or a group is 
playing, reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions should 
effectively curb the problems caused by players while permissibly 
restricting the players’ rights. 
c. Reasonable Regulations in Parks 
Limiting the players to certain areas might be an effective 
time, place, and manner restriction.  The downside of this 
limitation is that it could slip into an impermissible restriction of 
the First Amendment.  One issue is how the government can 
balance its interests with accommodating the players.  If players 
were limited to only the sidewalks, their gameplay would be 
quite limited.  Additionally, players might cause problems for 
pedestrian traffic, thus creating another issue for the 
government.  If players are limited to only certain areas within 
public parks, how would the government choose the areas to 
allow players to use?  The number of players may be 
determinative in where they could play because a group of two 
players would be much less disruptive than a group of twenty.  
Additionally, the size of the parks and proximity to other parks 
might matter. 
Other considerations might include whether the parks were 
designed with specific purposes in mind.  A large park like 
Central Park could theoretically have multiple areas designated 
 
194 For example, New York City requires one to obtain a permit to have an 
activity in a park with a group of twenty or more people. See Parks Special Event 
Permit Request, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF PARKS & RECREATION, 
https://nyceventpermits.nyc.gov/Parks/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2019). 
195 See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
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for players of location-based augmented reality games while 
avoiding certain areas designated as quiet areas or in areas 
where a player could most damage herself.  But if all of the 
closest parks are small, maybe less than a city block, then it 
might be more worthwhile to allow play in some of the parks but 
not all of them.  In such situations, the government may consider 
the accessibility of parks.  If there are four parks all within equal 
distance of each other, it might be beneficial to say that 
augmented reality games could be played in two of them.  Park 
rules could allow the playing of location-based augmented reality 
games on certain days, either alternating the days or limiting 
them to the weekend when most people would be playing.  One 
issue with such limitations, however, is that when fewer players 
are playing, they might not cause enough problems to warrant 
being limited to only certain areas or certain parks. 
The government may also consider the typical users of 
particular parks.  For example, it may not be reasonable for 
players to play augmented reality games in a dog park, but it 
would likely be reasonable to allow players to play in parks with 
no specific designation.  Whether it would be reasonable to play 
location-based augmented reality games in playgrounds may 
depend on the age of the players.  If children and their guardians 
were the players, such playing may be acceptable since 
playgrounds are designed for children.  However, if older players 
were invading playgrounds to play augmented reality games, 
they could potentially overtake the space from children.  The 
safety of children may also be affected if adults were suddenly 
loitering in playgrounds.  In such situations, a reasonable time, 
place, and manner regulation may be to create rules that only 
allow children and their guardians on the playground. 
Suppose a park that previously had no particular purpose or 
few daily visitors develops into a frequented location for location-
based augmented reality game players.  In many ways, such a 
development would be good because it would mean that players 
have a place to play without disturbing other people or activities.  
Now suppose that the government chooses to repurpose the park 
into a swimming pool or another facility that would remain 
public but would no longer be suitable for playing augmented 
reality video games.  Then the players would likely have a claim 
against the repurposing of the park because they are losing a 
place to freely play.  Not only would they lose a place to play, but 
they may also then flock to other areas, causing overcrowding 
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and other irritations that were previously eased by this park that 
had mainly been used by location-based augmented reality game 
players.  Alternatively, players may have already been limited to 
this park because other areas prohibit or severely limit the 
playing of augmented reality games.  Then players would have 
difficulties playing at all.  Ultimately, whether repurposing the 
park would be reasonable would depend on the importance and 
necessity of the new facility and on how burdensome the 
repurposing would be on location-based augmented reality game 
players. 
d. Reasonable Regulations on Sidewalks 
In addition to some limitations in parks, some limitations on 
playing on sidewalks might be reasonable.  For example, suppose 
that features of  augmented reality games appear within a 
hospital, and these features cause players to regularly roam 
around that hospital.  If such roaming interferes with hospital 
employees’ abilities to work, a small buffer zone might be 
warranted to protect the health and safety of citizens.196  
Legislatures may also potentially prohibit players from playing 
augmented reality games on the sidewalk in front of a post 
office—or any other sidewalk that may not be a public forum.197  
Finally, if players are consistently gathering on certain streets to 
the point where they are preventing the free flow of pedestrian 
traffic, then it may be reasonable to prohibit players from playing 
augmented reality games on those sidewalks. 
The areas in question may need to be areas that generally 
have a large amount of foot traffic for the prohibition to be 
reasonable.  Alternatively, the prohibition may be only for a few 
hours when the foot traffic would be most heavy—for example, 
during rush hour on weekdays.  To warn players about these 
regulations, signs could be placed in those areas that would be 
affected.  Like there are signs to warn people about fines for 
littering and about alternate side parking days, there could be 
signs on busy streets that would prohibit the playing of 
augmented reality games Monday through Friday between the 
hours of 4:00 PM and 6:00 PM.  Although this prohibition may  
 
 
196 The Supreme Court has recognized that ensuring public safety is a 
significant government interest. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 
U.S. 357, 376 (1997). 
197 See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 728–29, 732–33 (1990). 
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not be reasonable for the individual player, this limited 
prohibition could prevent congestion when sidewalks are most 
frequented. 
e. Reasonable Regulations in Streets 
Prohibiting players from playing augmented reality games 
on streets could also potentially be constitutional, especially in 
areas that have excessive motor vehicle traffic.  Problems would 
arise, however, in areas where there are no sidewalks.  If an 
ordinance prohibits people from playing augmented reality 
games in the streets, then the area of play would be vastly 
limited in areas where streets lack sidewalks.  It may also be 
unreasonable to prohibit someone from playing augmented 
reality games on streets that are always closed to motor vehicles 
or on occasions where the street is closed for a block party or 
festival.  If the government’s interest is to prevent players from 
causing motor vehicle accidents or from causing traffic, then such 
prohibitions during a block party or a festival would seem 
overbroad. 
Ideally, in areas with sidewalks, legislatures can pass 
regulations which limit the playing of augmented reality video 
games to sidewalks and to streets which drivers are prohibited 
from driving on at that time.  Such a regulation would prevent 
motor vehicle accidents caused by distracted pedestrian players 
while still allowing players to play on streets that lack motor 
vehicle traffic either temporarily or constantly.  In suburban and 
rural areas that lack sidewalks, prohibiting players from playing 
in streets may be reasonable on especially busy roads—for 
example, roads that have multiple lanes—but are likely 
unreasonable in the majority of circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
As augmented reality becomes more assimilated into society, 
courts will be forced to determine the boundaries of location-
based augmented reality games in relation to their First 
Amendment rights in traditional public forums.  Likely, permits 
are not viable solutions due to the general nature of gameplay, 
especially if the permits are aimed at the companies rather than 
the players.  Time, place, and manner restrictions that regulate  
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the players would likely be the most effective way to curb some 
problems that result from people playing location-based 
augmented reality games, but creating a restriction that is 
constitutional is a challenge that legislatures must test. 
The most effective way to ease problems caused by individual 
players would be to enforce laws already in effect.  Such 
enforcement would be most consistent with the First Amendment 
rights of the players while safeguarding the government’s 
legitimate interests.  To ease problems caused by assemblies of 
players, legislatures will likely have to create new laws.  Some 
reasonable time, place, and manner regulations may include 
small buffer-zones around hospital entrances, prohibiting playing 
in streets that have excessive motor vehicle traffic, and allocating 
areas for groups of players to freely play. 
At times, reasonable time, place, and manner regulations for 
groups may be unreasonable for individual players.  For example, 
prohibiting the playing of augmented reality games during rush 
hour on busy sidewalks would better allow for the free flow of 
foot traffic, but likely one player could be playing on a busy 
sidewalk without causing more pedestrian congestion.  Likewise, 
an individual playing in a designated quiet section of a park 
would likely not disturb the tranquility of the area even if an 
assembly of players would.  In such situations, it would be unfair 
to restrict individual players the same way that one would 
restrict assemblies of players.  However, individual players could 
quickly transform into an assembly of players organically, thus 
causing the same problems as if the assembly had been 
premeditated.  Legislatures and courts may need to choose 
between sacrificing some of the protections afforded to individual 
players and enabling the government to protect legitimate 
government interests that are threatened by assemblies of 
players. 
Whether the law should favor individual players or 
legitimate government interests will depend on the 
circumstances.  If statistics indicate that a specific area is more 
prone to large assemblies of players to the detriment of non-
players and the purpose of the space, then it may be reasonable 
to sacrifice some First Amendment protections of individual 
players.  Prohibiting the playing of augmented reality games on 
excessive foot traffic sidewalks during rush hour would likely be 
reasonable if statistics indicated a consistent issue.  Prohibiting 
players from playing in quiet areas in parks may also be 
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reasonable if groups of players are consistent problems, but then 
players would need other areas available for them to play.  It 
would be unreasonable to slowly prohibit players from playing in 
every section of a large park because they had been prohibited 
from playing in other areas.  Designated playing areas may make 
prohibiting players from playing in other areas more reasonable. 
While regulating the players would likely be the most 
effective in protecting legitimate government interests, some 
measures regulating designers may be reasonable.  For example, 
the legislature could require designers to prevent gameplay from 
occurring when a person is moving over fifteen miles per hour.198  
Ultimately, what will be reasonable regulations for either players 
or designers will depend on the circumstances. 
 
 
 
198 See supra note 180. 
